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 DEPENDENT ARISING AND THE EMPTINESS
 OF EMPTINESS: WHY DID NAGARJUNA
 START WITH CAUSATION?
 1. Introduction
 Nagarjuna, who lived in South India in approximately the first century
 C.E., is undoubtedly the most important, influential, and widely studied
 Mahayana Buddhist philosopher. He is the founder of the Madhyamika,
 or Middle Path, schools of Mahayana Buddhism. His considerable corpus
 includes texts addressed to lay audiences, letters of advice to kings, and
 the set of penetrating metaphysical and epistemological treatises that
 represent the foundation of the highly skeptical and dialectical analytic
 philosophical school known as Madhyamika. Most important of these is
 his largest and best-known text, the Muilamadhyamikakarika-in English,
 Fundamental Stanzas on the Middle Way. This text in turn inspires a huge
 commentarial literature in Sanskrit, Tibetan, Chinese, Korean, and Japa-
 nese. Divergences in interpretation of the Mulamadhyamikakarika often
 determine the splits between major philosophical schools. So, for in-
 stance, the distinction between two of the three major Mahayana philo-
 sophical schools, Svatantrika-Madhyamika and Prasargika-Madhyamika,
 reflect, inter alia, distinct readings of this text, itself taken as fundamental
 by scholars within each of these schools.
 The treatise itself is composed in very terse, often cryptic verses, with
 much of the explicit argument suppressed, generating significant inter-
 pretative challenges. But the uniformity of the philosophical methodology
 and the clarity of the central philosophical vision expressed in the text
 together provide a considerable fulcrum for exegesis. The central topic of
 the text is emptiness-the Buddhist technical term for the lack of inde-
 pendent existence, inherent existence, or essence in things. Nagarjuna
 relentlessly analyzes phenomena or processes that appear to exist inde-
 pendently and argues that they cannot so exist, and yet, though lacking
 the inherent existence imputed to them either by naive common sense
 or by sophisticated, realistic philosophical theory, these phenomena are
 not nonexistent-they are, he argues, conventionally real.
 This dual thesis of the conventional reality of phenomena together
 with their lack of inherent existence depends upon the complex doctrine
 of the two truths or two realities-a conventional or nominal truth and
 an ultimate truth-and upon a subtle and surprising doctrine regarding
 their relation. It is, in fact, this sophisticated development of the doctrine
 of the two truths as a vehicle for understanding Buddhist metaphysics
 and epistemology that is Nagarjuna's greatest philosophical contribution.
 If the analysis in terms of emptiness is the substantial heart of Mulama-
 dhyamikakarika, the method of reductio ad absurdum is the methodolog-
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 Philosophy East & West
 ical core. Nagarjuna, like Western skeptics, systematically eschews the
 defense of positive metaphysical doctrines regarding the nature of things,
 demonstrating rather that any such positive thesis is incoherent, and that
 in the end our conventions and our conceptual framework can never be
 justified by demonstrating their correspondence to an independent real-
 ity. Rather, he suggests, what counts as real depends precisely upon our
 conventions.'
 For Nagarjuna and his followers, this point is connected deeply and
 directly with the emptiness of phenomena. That is, for instance, when a
 Madhyamika philosopher says of a table that it is empty, that assertion
 by itself is incomplete. It invites the question, "empty of what?" And the
 answer is: "empty of inherent existence, or self-nature, or, in more West-
 ern terms, essence." Now, to say that the table is empty is hence simply
 to say that it lacks essence and, importantly, not to say that it is com-
 pletely nonexistent. To say that it lacks essence, the Madhyamika philoso-
 pher will explain, is to say, as the Tibetans like to put it, that it does not
 exist "from its own side"-that its existence as the object that it is, as a
 table, depends not only upon it or on any purely nonrelational character-
 istics, but upon us as well. That is, if this kind of furniture had not evolved
 in our culture, what appears to us to be an obviously unitary object might
 instead be correctly described as five objects: four quite useful sticks
 absurdly surmounted by a pointless slab of stick-wood waiting to be
 carved. It is also to say that the table depends for its existence on its parts,
 on its causes, on its material, and so forth. Apart from these, there is no
 table. The table, we might say, is a purely arbitrary slice of space-time
 chosen by us as the referent of a single name, and not an entity de-
 manding, on its own, recognition and a philosophical analysis to reveal
 its essence. That independent character is precisely what it lacks, on this
 view.
 And this analysis in terms of emptiness-an analysis refusing to
 characterize the nature of any thing, precisely because it denies that we
 can make sense of the idea of a thing's nature-proceeding by the
 relentless refutation of any attempt to provide such a positive analysis, is
 applied by Nagarjuna to all phenomena, including, most radically, empti-
 ness itself. For if Nagarjuna merely argued that all phenomena are empty,
 one might justly indict him for in fact merely replacing one analysis of
 things with another; that is, with arguing that emptiness is in fact the
 essence of all things. But Nagarjuna, as we shall see, argues that empti-
 ness itself is empty. It is not a self-existent void standing behind the veil
 of illusion represented by conventional reality, but merely an aspect of
 conventional reality. And this, as we shall see, is what provides the key
 to understanding the deep unity between the two truths.
 While Nagarjuna is a powerfully original thinker, he is clearly and
 self-consciously operating squarely within the framework of Buddhist
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 philosophy. Therefore, Nagarjuna accepts, and takes it as incumbent
 upon him, to provide an account of the Four Noble Truths. Moreover, he
 takes it as a fundamental philosophical task to provide an understanding
 of what Buddhist philosophy refers to as pratTtyasammutpada-depen-
 dent co-origination. This term denotes the nexus between phenomena in
 virtue of which events depend on other events, composites depend upon
 their parts, and so forth. Just how this dependency is spelled out, and just
 what is its status is a matter of considerable debate within Buddhist
 philosophy, just as the nature of causation and explanation is a matter of
 great dispute within Western philosophy. Nagarjuna is very much con-
 cerned to stake out a radical and revealing position in this debate. I will
 argue that this position provides the key to understanding his entire text.
 The Mulamadhyamikakarika is divided into twenty-seven chapters.
 The first chapter addresses dependent origination. While many Western
 commentators assert that this chapter opens the text simply because it
 addresses a "fundamental doctrine of Buddhism" (Kalupahana 1986), I will
 argue that Nagarjuna begins with causation for deeper, more systematic
 reasons. In chapters 2 through 23, Nagarjuna addresses a wide range
 of phenomena, including external perceptibles, psychological processes,
 relations, and putative substances and attributes, arguing that all are
 empty. In the final four chapters, Nagarjuna replies to objections and
 generalizes the particular analyses into a broad theory concerning the
 nature of emptiness itself and the relation between the two truths, empti-
 ness and dependent arising itself. It is generally, and in my view correctly,
 acknowledged that chapter 24, the examination of the Four Noble Truths,
 is the central chapter of the text and the climax of the argument. One
 verse of this chapter, verse 18, has received so much attention that
 interpretations of it alone represent the foundations of major Buddhist
 schools in East Asia:
 Whatever is dependently co-arisen
 That is explained to be emptiness.
 That, being a dependent designation
 Is itself the middle way.
 Here Nagarjuna asserts the fundamental identity of (1) emptiness, or the
 ultimate truth, (2) the dependently originated-that is, all phenomena-
 and (3) verbal convention. Moreover, he asserts that understanding this
 relation is itself the middle-way philosophical view he articulates in the
 Mulamadhyamikakarika. This verse and the discussion in the chapters that
 follow provide the fulcrum for CandrakTrti's more explicit characterization
 of the emptiness of emptiness as an interpretation of Nagarjuna's philo-
 sophical system-the interpretation that is definitive of the Prasargika-
 Madhyamika school. In what follows I will provide an interpretation of this
 central verse and its context that harmonizes with Candrakirti's and Jay L. Garfield
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 argue that, in fact, this doctrine is already to be found in the opening
 chapter of the text-the examination of conditions. Reading the text in
 this way, I will argue, locates the doctrine of the emptiness of emptiness
 not only as a dramatic philosophical conclusion to be drawn at the end
 of twenty-four chapters of argument, but as the perspective implicit in
 the argument from the very beginning, and only rendered explicit in
 chapter 24. Reading the text in this way, I will suggest, also shows us
 exactly how 24:18 is to be understood, and just why a proper under-
 standing of causality is so central to Buddhist philosophy.
 I will begin by offering a philosophical reading of chapter 1. I will
 argue that Nagarjuna distinguishes two possible views of dependent
 origination or the causal process-one according to which causes bring
 about their effects in virtue of causal powers and one according to which
 causal relations simply amount to explanatorily useful regularities-and
 defends the latter. This, I will argue, when suitably fleshed out, amounts
 to Nagarjuna's doctrine of the emptiness of causation. I will then turn
 immediately to chapter 24, focusing on the link between emptiness,
 dependent origination, and convention, and developing the theory of the
 emptiness of emptiness. With this in hand, we will return to chapter 1,
 showing how this doctrine is anticipated in the initial discussion of causa-
 tion. Finally, I will show quickly how this way of reading the texts changes
 the way we would read subsequent chapters, and I will make a few gen-
 eral remarks about the moral of this textual exercise for an understanding
 of the centrality of causation to metaphysics and for an understanding of
 the remarkably pragmatic outlook of Madhyamika philosophy.
 Philosophy East & West
 2. Chapter 1-Examination of Conditions
 Central to this first chapter is the distinction between causes and
 conditions (Skt hetu and pratyaya [Tib rGyu and rKyen]. This distinction
 is variously drawn and is controversial,2 and is arguably differently under-
 stood in Sanskrit and Tibetan. The way I will understand it here, I argue,
 makes good, coherent sense not only of this chapter, but of the Mulama-
 dhyamikakarika as a whole. Briefly, we will understand this distinction as
 follows: When Nagarjuna uses the word "cause" (hetu [rGyu]), he has in
 mind an event or state that has in it a power(kriya[Bya Ba]) to bring about
 its effect, and has that power as part of its essence or nature (svabhava
 [Rang bZhin]). When he uses the term "condition," on the other hand
 (pratyaya [rKyen]), he has in mind an event, state, or process that can be
 appealed to in explaining another event, state, or process, without any
 metaphysical commitment to any occult connection between explan-
 andum and explanans. In chapter 1, Nagarjuna, we shall see, argues
 against the existence of causes and for the existence of a variety of kinds
 of conditions.3
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 The argument against causation is tightly intertwined with the posi-
 tive account of dependent arising and of the nature of the relation
 between conditions and the conditioned. Nagarjuna begins by stating the
 conclusion (1:1): neither are entities self-caused nor do they come to be
 through the power of other entities. That is, there is no causation, when
 causation is thought of as involving causal activity.4 Nonetheless, he
 notes (1:2), there are conditions-in fact four distinct kinds-that can be
 appealed to in the explanation and prediction of phenomena. An exam-
 ple might be useful to illustrate the difference between the four kinds of
 condition, and the picture Nagarjuna will paint of explanation. Suppose
 that you ask, "Why are the lights on?" I might reply as follows: (1) Because
 I flicked the switch. I have appealed to an efficient condition. Or (2)
 because the wires are in good working order, the bulbs haven't burned
 out, and the electricity is flowing. These are supporting conditions. Or (3)
 the light is the emission of photons each of which is emitted in response
 to the bombardment of an atom by an electron, and so forth. I have
 appealed to a chain of immediate conditions. Or (4) so that we can see.
 This is the dominant condition. Any of these would be a perfectly good
 answer to the "Why?" question. But note that none of them makes
 reference to any causal powers or necessitation.
 The next three verses are crucial. Nagarjuna first notes (1:3) that in
 examining a phenomenon and its relations to its conditions, we do not
 find that phenomenon somehow contained potentially in those condi-
 tions. Now, on the reading of this chapter, I will suggest, we can see
 conditions simply as useful explanans. Using this language, we can see
 Nagarjuna as urging that even distinguishing clearly between explanans
 and explanandum as distinct entities, with the former containing poten-
 tially what the latter has actually, is problematic. What we are typically
 confronted with in nature is a vast network of interdependent and con-
 tinuous processes, and carving out particular phenomena for explanation
 or for use in explanations depends more on our explanatory interests
 and language than on joints nature presents to us. Through addressing
 the question of the potential existence of an event in its conditions,
 Nagarjuna hints at this concealed relation between praxis and reality.
 Next, Nagarjuna notes (1:4) that in exploiting an event or entity as a
 condition in explanation, we do not thereby ascribe it any causal power.
 Our desire for light does not exert some occult force on the lights. Nor is
 there anything to be found in the flicking of the switch other than the
 plastic, metal, movement, and connections visible to the naked eye.
 Occult causal powers are singularly absent. On the other hand, Nagarjuna
 points out in the same breath that this does not mean that conditions are
 explanatorily impotent. In a perfectly ordinary sense-not that which the
 metaphysicians of causation have in mind-our desire is active in the  Jay L. Garfield
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 production of light. But not in the sense that it contains light potentially,
 or some special causal power that connects our minds to the bulbs.5
 What is it, then, about some sets of event pairs, but not others, that
 make them dependently related, if not some causal link present in some
 cases but not in others? Nagarjuna replies (1: 5) that it is the regularities
 that count. Flickings give rise to illuminations. So they are conditions of
 them. If they didn't, they wouldn't be. Period. Explanation relies on regu-
 larities. Regularities are explained by reference to further regularities.
 Adding active forces or potentials adds nothing of explanatory utility to
 the picture.6
 In reading the next few verses we must be hermeneutically cautious,
 and pay careful attention to Nagarjuna's use of the term "existent" (satah
 [Yodpa]) and its negative contrastive "nonexistent" (asatah [Medpa]). For
 Nagarjuna is worried here about inherent existence and inherent non-
 existence, as opposed to conventionalexistence or nonexistence. Though
 this will become clearer as we go along, keep in mind for the present that
 for a thing to exist inherently is for it to exist in virtue of possessing an
 essence; for it to exist independently of other entities, and independently
 of convention. For a thing to be inherently nonexistent is for it to not exist
 in any sense at all-not even conventionally or dependently.
 With this in mind, we can see how Nagarjuna defends dependent
 arising while rejecting causation. He notes (1:6) that if entities are con-
 ceived as inherently existent, they exist independently, and hence need
 no conditions for their production. Indeed, they could not be produced
 if they exist in this way. On the other hand, if things exist in no way
 whatsoever, it follows trivially that they have no conditions. This verse
 and the several that follow (1:6-10) make this point with regard to each
 of the four kinds of conditions.
 What is important about this strand of the argument? Nagarjuna is
 drawing attention to the connection between a causal-power view of
 causation and an essentialist view of phenomena on the one hand, and
 between a condition view of dependent arising and a conventional view
 of phenomena on the other. Here is the point: if one views phenomena
 as having and as emerging from casual powers, one views them as having
 essences and as being connected to the essences of other phenomena.
 This, Nagarjuna suggests, is ultimately incoherent, since it forces one at
 the same time to assert the inherent existence of these things, in virtue
 of their essential identity, and to assert their dependence and productive
 character, in virtue of their causal history and power. But such depen-
 dence and relational character, he suggests, is incompatible with their
 inherent existence. If, on the other hand, one regards things as dependent
 merely on conditions, one regards them as merely conventionally exis-
 tent. And to regard something as merely conventionally existent is to
 regard it as without essence and without power. And this is to regard it
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 as existing dependently. This provides a coherent, mundane understand-
 ing of phenomena as an alternative to the metaphysics of reification that
 Nagarjuna criticizes.
 Verse 10 is central in this discussion.
 If things did not exist
 Without essence,
 The phrase, "When this exists so this will be,"
 Would not be acceptable.
 Nagarjuna is replying here to the causal realist's inference from the
 reality of causal powers to their embodiment in real entities whose
 essences include those powers. He turns the tables on the realist, arguing
 that it is precisely because there is no such reality to things-and hence
 no entities to serve as the bearers of the causal powers the realist wants
 to posit-that the Buddhist formula expressing the truth of dependent
 arising7 can be asserted. It could not be asserted if in fact there were real
 entities. For if they were real in the sense important for the realist, they
 would be independent. So if the formula were interpreted in this context
 as pointing to any causal power, it would be false. It can only be inter-
 preted, it would follow, as a formula expressing the regularity of nature.
 In the next three verses (1: 11-13) Nagarjuna anticipates and answers
 the causal realist's reply. First, the realist argues that the conclusion
 Nagarjuna draws from the unreality of causal power-the nonexistence
 of things (where "existence" is read "inherent existence")-entails the
 falsity of the claim that things dependently arise (1:11). For if there are no
 things, surely nothing arises. This charge has a double edge: if the argu-
 ment is successful it shows not only that Nagarjuna's own position
 is vacuous, but also that it contradicts one of the most fundamental
 tenets of Buddhist philosophy: that all phenomena are dependently aris-
 en. Moreover, the opponent charges (1:11), on Nagarjuna's view that the
 explanandum is not to be found potentially in the explanans, there is no
 explanation of how the former is to be understood as depending upon
 the latter. As Nagarjuna will emphasize, however (1:14), the very struc-
 ture of this charge contains the seeds of its reply. The very emptiness of
 the effect, an effect presupposed by the opponent to be nonempty, in
 fact follows from the emptiness of the conditions and of the relationship
 between conditions and effect. Hence Nagarjuna can reply to the oppo-
 nents' attempted refutation by embracing the conclusion of his reductio
 together with the premises it supposedly refutes.
 How, the opponent asks, are we to distinguish coincidental sequence
 from causal consequence? And why (1: 12) don't things simply arise ran-
 domly from events that are nonconditions, since no special connection
 is posited to link consequents to their proper causal antecedents? Finally,
 the opponent asks (1:13), since the phenomena we observe clearly have Jay L. Garfield
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 natures, how could it be, as Nagarjuna argues, that they proceed by
 means of a process with no essence, from conditions with no essence?
 Whence do the natures of actual existents arise? Nagarjuna again replies
 to this last charge by pointing out that since on his view the effects
 indeed have no essence, the opponent's presupposition is ill-founded.
 This move also indicates a reply to the problem posed in (1:12); that
 problem is grounded in the mistaken view that a phenomenon's lack of
 inherent existence entails that it, being nonexistent, could come into
 existence from nowhere. But "from nowhere," for the opponent, means
 from something lacking inherent existence. And indeed, for Nagarjuna,
 this is exactly the case: effects lacking inherent existence depend pre-
 cisely upon conditions which themselves lack inherent existence.
 Nagarjuna's summary of the import of this set of replies (1:14) is terse
 and cryptic. But unpacking it with the aid of what has gone before
 provides an important key to understanding the doctrine of the empti-
 ness of causation that is the burden of this chapter. First, Nagarjuna
 points out, the opponent begs the question in asserting the genuine
 existence of the effects in question. They, like their conditions, and like
 the process of dependent origination itself, are nonexistent from the
 ultimate point of view. Hence the third charge fails. As a consequence, in
 the sense in which the opponent supposes that these effects proceed
 from their conditions-namely that their essence is contained potentially
 in their causes, which themselves exist inherently-these effects need
 not be so produced. And so, finally, the effect-containing conditions for
 which the opponent charges Nagarjuna with being unable to account are
 themselves unnecessary. In short, while the reificationist critic charges
 the Madhyamika with failing to come up with a causal link sufficiently
 robust to link ultimately real phenomena, for the Madhyamika philoso-
 pher, the core reason for the absence of such a causal link is the very
 absence of such phenomena in the first place.
 We are now in a position to characterize explicitly the emptiness of
 causation, and the way this doctrine is identical with the doctrine of
 dependent origination from conditions adumbrated in this chapter. It is
 best to offer this characterization using the via media formulation most
 consonant with Nagarjuna's philosophical school. We will locate the
 doctrine as a midpoint between two extreme philosophical views. That
 midpoint is achieved by taking conventions as the foundation of ontol-
 ogy, hence rejecting the very enterprise of a philosophical search for the
 ontological foundations of convention (Garfield 1990). To say that causa-
 tion is nonempty or inherently existent is to succumb to the temptation
 to ground our explanatory practice and discourse in genuine causal
 powers linking causes to effects. That is the reificationist extreme which
 Nagarjuna clearly rejects. To respond to the arguments against the inher-
 ent existence of causation by suggesting that there is then no possibility
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 of appealing to conditions to explain phenomena-that there is no
 dependent origination at all-is the extreme of nihilism, also clearly
 rejected by Nagarjuna. To assert the emptiness of causation is to accept
 the utility of our causal discourse and explanatory practice, but to resist
 the temptation to see these as grounded in reference to causal powers
 or as demanding such grounding. Dependent origination simply is the
 explicability and coherence of the universe. Its emptiness is the fact that
 there is no more to it than that.
 Now this is certainly philosophically interesting stuff in its own right.
 But as I suggested at the outset, there is more to it than just an analysis
 of causation and dependent arising. For, as we shall see, for Nagarjuna,
 among the most important means of demonstrating the emptiness of
 phenomena is to argue that they are dependently arisen. And so the
 claim that dependent arising itself is empty will turn out to be the
 claim that the emptiness of phenomena is itself empty-the central and
 deepest claim of Madhyamika ontology.
 3. Chapter 24-Examination of the Four Noble Truths
 While Chapter 24 ostensibly concerns the Four Buddhist Truths and
 the way they are to be understood from the vantage point of emptiness,
 it is really about the nature of emptiness itself, and about the relation
 between emptiness and conventional reality. As such, it is the philo-
 sophical heart of the Mlaamadhyamikakjrika. The first six verses of the
 chapter (24:1-6) present a reply to Nagarjuna's doctrine of emptiness by
 an opponent charging the doctrine with nihilism. The next eight verses
 (24:7-14) are primarily rhetorical, castigating the opponent for his mis-
 understanding of Madhyamika. The important philosophical work begins
 with 24:15. From this point Nagarjuna offers a theory of the relationship
 between emptiness, dependent origination, and convention, and argues
 not only that these three can be understood as co-relative, but that
 if conventional things (or emptiness itself) were nonempty, the very
 nihilism would ensue with which the reificationist opponent charges
 Madhyamika. This tactic of arguing not only against each extreme but
 also that the contradictory extremes are in fact mutually entailing is a
 dialectical trademark of Nagarjuna's philosophical method. Because of
 the length of this chapter, I will not provide a verse-by-verse reading here,
 but only a general gloss of the argument, with special attention to critical
 verses.
 The opponent opens the chapter by claiming that if the entire phe-
 nomenal world were empty nothing would in fact exist, a conclusion
 absurd on its face and, more importantly, contradictory to fundamental
 Buddhist tenets such as the Four Noble Truths (24:1-6) as well as to
 conventional wisdom. The implicit dilemma with which Nagarjuna con-
 fronts himself is elegant (24:6). For as we have seen, the distinction Jay L. Garfield
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 between the two truths, or two vantage points-the ultimate and the
 conventional-is fundamental to his own method. So when the oppo-
 nent charges that the assertion of the nonexistence of such things as the
 Four Noble Truths and of the arising, abiding, and ceasing of entities is
 contradictory both to conventional wisdom and to the ultimate truth
 (namely, on one straightforward interpretation, that all phenomena are
 impermanent, that is, merely arising, abiding momentarily, and ceasing),
 Nagarjuna is forced to defend himself on both fronts and to comment on
 the connection between these standpoints.
 Nagarjuna launches the reply by charging the opponent with foisting
 the opponent's own understanding of emptiness on Nagarjuna. Though
 this is not made as explicit in the text as one might like, it is important to
 note that the understanding Nagarjuna has in mind is one that, in the
 terms of Madhyamika, reifies emptiness itself. Verse 24:16 provides a
 clue.
 If the existence of all things
 Is perceived in terms of their essence,
 Then this perception of all things
 Will be without the perception of causes and conditions.
 The opponent is seeing actual existence as a discrete entity with an
 essence. It would follow that for the opponent, the reality of emptiness
 would entail that emptiness itself is an entity, and at that an inherently
 existing entity. To see emptiness in this way is to see it as radically
 different from conventional, phenomenal reality. It is to see the conven-
 tional as illusory and emptiness as the reality standing behind it. To adopt
 this view of emptiness is indeed to deny the reality of the entire phenom-
 enal, conventional world. It is also to ascribe a special, nonconventional,
 nondependent hyperreality to emptiness itself. Ordinary things would be
 viewed as nonexistent, emptiness as substantially existent. (It is important
 and central to the Madhyamika dialectic to see that these go together-
 that nihilism about one kind of entity is typically paired with reification
 of another.) This view is not uncommon in Buddhist philosophy, and
 Nagarjuna is clearly aware that it might be suggested by his own position.
 So Nagarjuna's reply must begin by distancing himself from this reified
 view of emptiness itself and hence from the dualism it entails. Only then
 can he show that to reify emptiness in this way would indeed entail the
 difficulties his imaginary opponent adumbrates, difficulties not attaching
 to Nagarjuna's own view. This brings us to the central verses of this
 chapter (24:18 and 24:19):
 Whatever is dependently co-arisen
 That is explained to be emptiness.
 That, being a dependent designation
 Philosophy East & West Is itself the middle way.
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 Something that is not dependently arisen,
 Such a thing does not exist.
 Therefore a non-empty thing
 Does not exist.
 These verses demand careful scrutiny. In 24:18, Nagarjuna estab-
 lishes a critical three-way relation between emptiness, dependent origina-
 tion, and verbal convention, and asserts that this relation itself is the
 Middle Way towards which his entire philosophical system is aimed.
 As we shall see, this is the basis for understanding the emptiness of
 emptiness itself. First, Nagarjuna asserts that the dependently arisen is
 emptiness. Emptiness and the phenomenal world are not two distinct
 things. They are rather two characterizations of the same thing. To say of
 something that it is dependently co-arisen is to say that it is empty. To
 say of something that it is empty is another way of saying that it arises
 dependently.
 Moreover, whatever is dependently co-arisen is verbally established.
 That is, the identity of any dependently arisen thing depends upon verbal
 conventions. To say of a thing that it is dependently arisen is to say that
 its identity as a single entity is nothing more than its being the referent
 of a word. The thing itself, apart from conventions of individuation, is
 nothing but an arbitrary slice of an indefinite spatiotemporal and causal
 manifold. To say of a thing that its identity is a merely verbal fact about
 it is to say that it is empty. To view emptiness in this way is to see it
 neither as an entity nor as unreal-it is to see it as conventionally real.
 Moreover, "emptiness" itself is asserted to be a dependent designation
 (Skt prajnaptir-upadaya [brTen Nas gDags pa]). Its referent, emptiness
 itself, is thereby asserted to be merely dependent and nominal-conven-
 tionally existent but ultimately empty. This is, hence, a middle path with
 regard to emptiness. To view the dependently originated world in this
 way is to see it neither as nonempty nor as completely nonexistent. It is,
 viewed in this way, conventionally existent, but empty. We thus have a
 middle path with regard to dependent origination. To view convention in
 this way is to view it neither as ontologically insignificant-it determines
 the character of the phenomenal world-nor as ontologically efficacious
 -it is empty. Thus we also have a middle way with regard to convention.
 And finally, given the nice ambiguity in the reference of "that," (De Ni),
 not only are "dependent arising" and "emptiness" asserted to be depen-
 dent designations, and hence merely nominal, but the very relation
 between them is asserted to be so dependent, and therefore to be
 empty.8
 These morals are driven home in 24:19, where Nagarjuna empha-
 sizes that everything-and this must include emptiness-is dependently
 arisen. So everything-including emptiness-lacks inherent existence.  Jay L. Garfield
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 So nothing lacks the three coextensive properties of emptiness, dependent-
 origination, and conventional identity.
 With this in hand, Nagarjuna can reply to the critic. He first points
 out (24:20-35) that in virtue of the identity of dependent origination and
 emptiness on the one hand and of ontological independence and intrin-
 sic reality on the other, such phenomena as arising, ceasing, suffering,
 change, enlightenment, and so on-the very phenomena the opponent
 charges Nagarjuna with denying-are possible only if they are empty.
 The tables are thus turned: it appears that Nagarjuna, in virtue of arguing
 for the emptiness of these phenomena, was arguing that in reality they
 do not exist, precisely because, for the reifier of emptiness, existence and
 emptiness are opposites. But in fact, because of the identity of emptiness
 and conventional existence, it is the reifier who, in virtue of denying the
 emptiness of these phenomena, denies their existence. And it is hence
 the reifier of emptiness who is impaled on both horns of the dilemma s/he
 has presented to Nagarjuna: contradicting the ultimate truth, s/he denies
 that these phenomena are empty; contradicting the conventional, s/he is
 forced to deny that they even exist! And so Nagarjuna can conclude
 (24: 36):
 If dependent arising is denied,
 Emptiness itself is rejected.
 This would contradict
 All of the worldly conventions.
 To assert the nonemptiness of phenomena and of their interrelations,
 Nagarjuna suggests, when emptiness is properly understood, is not only
 philosophically deeply confused, it is contradictory to common sense.
 We can make sense of this argument in the following way: common
 sense neither posits nor requires intrinsic reality in phenomena or a real
 causal nexus; common sense holds the world to be a network of depen-
 dently arisen phenomena. So common sense holds the world to be
 empty. Again, the standpoint of emptiness is not at odds with the con-
 ventional standpoint, only with a particular philosophical understanding
 of it-that which takes the conventional to be more than merely con-
 ventional. What is curious-and, from the Buddhist standpoint, sad-
 about the human condition, on this view, is the naturalness and seduc-
 tiveness of that philosophical perspective.9
 4. The Emptiness of Emptiness
 Let us consider now what it is to say that emptiness itself is empty.
 The claim, even in the context of Buddhist philosophy, does have a
 somewhat paradoxical air. For emptiness is, in Mahayana philosophical
 thought, the ultimate nature of all phenomena. And the distinction be-
 tween the merely conventional nature of things and their ultimate nature
 Philosophy East & West would seem to mark the distinction between the apparent and the real.
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 While it is plausible to say that what is merely apparent is empty of reality,
 it seems nihilistic to say that what is ultimately real is empty of reality,
 and, as we have seen, the Madhyamika are quite consciously antinihilis-
 tic. But again, when we say that a phenomenon is empty, we say, inter
 alia, that it is impermanent, that it depends upon conditions, and that its
 identity is dependent upon convention. Do we really want to say of each
 phenomenon that its emptiness-the fact that it is empty-is itself
 impermanent, itself dependent on something else, itself dependent upon
 conventions? It might at least appear that even if all other properties of
 conventional entities were so, their emptiness would be an eternal, inde-
 pendent, essential fact.
 It may be useful to approach the emptiness of emptiness by first
 asking what it would be to treat emptiness as nonempty. When we say
 that a phenomenon is empty, we mean that when we try to specify its
 essence, we come up with nothing. When we look for the substance that
 underlies the properties, or the bearer of the parts, we find none. When
 we ask what it is that gives a thing its identity, we stumble not upon
 ontological facts but upon conventions. For a thing to be nonempty
 would be for it to have an essence discoverable upon analysis; for it to
 be a substance independent of its attributes, or a bearer of parts; for its
 identity to be self-determined by its essence. A nonempty entity can be
 fully characterized nonrelationally.
 For emptiness to be nonempty would be for it to be a substantial
 entity, an independent existent, a nonconventional phenomenon. On
 such a view, arguably held by certain Buddhist philosophical schools,
 emptiness is entirely distinct from any conventional phenomenon. It is,
 on such a view, the object of correct perception, while conventional
 phenomena are the objects of delusive perception. While conventional
 phenomena are dependent upon conventions, conditions, or the igno-
 rance of obstructed minds, emptiness, on such a view, is apparent pre-
 cisely when one sees through those conventions, dispels that ignorance,
 and overcomes those obstructions. It has no parts or conditions, and no
 properties. Though such a position might appear metaphysically extrava-
 gant, it is hardly unmotivated. For one thing, it seems that emptiness does
 have an identifiable essence-namely the lack of inherent existence. So
 if to be empty is to be empty of essence, emptiness fails on that count to
 be empty. Moreover, since all phenomena, on the Madhyamika view,
 are empty, emptiness would appear to be eternal and independent of
 any particular conventions, and hence not dependently arisen. The Two
 Truths, on such an ontological vision, are indeed radically distinct from
 one another.
 But this position is, from Nagarjuna's perspective, untenable. The best
 way to see that is as follows. Suppose that we take a conventional entity,
 such as a table. We analyze it to demonstrate its emptiness, finding that Jay L. Garfield
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 there is no table apart from its parts, that it cannot be distinguished in a
 principled way from its antecedent and subsequent histories, and so
 forth. So we conclude that it is empty. But now let us analyze that
 emptiness-the emptiness of the table-to see what we find. What do
 we find? Nothing at all but the table's lack of inherent existence. The
 emptiness is dependent upon the table. No conventional table-no
 emptiness of the table. To see the table as empty, for Nagarjuna, is not
 to somehow see "beyond" the illusion of the table to some other, more
 real entity. It is to see the table as conventional, as dependent. But the
 table that we so see when we see its emptiness is the very same table,
 seen not as the substantial thing we instinctively posit, but rather as it is.
 Emptiness is hence not different from conventional reality-it is the fact
 that conventional reality is conventional. Therefore it must be depen-
 dently arisen, since it depends upon the existence of empty phenomena.
 Hence emptiness itself is empty. This is perhaps the deepest and most
 radical step in the Madhyamika dialectic, but it is also, as we shall see,
 the step that saves it from falling into metaphysical extravagance and
 brings it back to sober, pragmatic skepticism.
 Now, this doctrine of the emptiness of emptiness emerges directly
 from 24:18.
 Whatever is dependently co-arisen
 That is explained to be emptiness.
 That, being a dependent designation
 Is itself the middle way.
 Philosophy East & West
 For the emptiness of emptiness, as we have just seen, simply amounts to
 the identification of emptiness with the property of being dependently
 arisen, and with the property of having an identity just in virtue of
 conventional, verbal designation. It is the fact that emptiness is no more
 than this that makes it empty, just as it is the fact that conventional
 phenomena in general are no more than conventional, and no more than
 their parts and status in the causal nexus that makes them empty.'0
 So the doctrine of the emptiness of emptiness can be seen as inextri-
 cably linked with Nagarjuna's distinctive account of the relation between
 the two truths. For Nagarjuna, as is also evident in this crucial verse, it is
 a mistake to distinguish conventional from ultimate reality-the depen-
 dently arisen from emptiness-at an ontological level. Emptiness just is
 the emptiness of conventional phenomena. To perceive conventional
 phenomena as empty is just to see them as conventional, and as depen-
 dently arisen. The difference-such as it is-between the conventional
 and the ultimate is a difference in the way phenomena are conceived/
 perceived. The point must be formulated with some delicacy, and cannot
 be formulated without a hint of the paradoxical about it: conventional
 phenomena are typically represented as inherently existent. We typically
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 perceive and conceive of external phenomena, ourselves, causal powers,
 moral truths, and so forth as independently existing, intrinsically identifi-
 able and substantial. But though this is, in one sense, the conventional
 character of conventional phenomena-the manner in which they are
 ordinarily experienced-to see them this way is precisely not to see them
 as conventional. To see that they are merely conventional, in the sense
 adumbrated above and defended by Nagarjuna and his followers, is
 thereby to see them as empty, and this is their ultimate mode of exis-
 tence. These are the two truths about phenomena: On the one hand they
 are conventionally existent and the things we ordinarily say about them
 are in fact true, to the extent that we get it right on the terms of the
 everyday. Snow is indeed white, and there are indeed tables and chairs
 in this room. On the other hand, they are ultimately nonexistent. These
 two truths seem as different as night and day-being and nonbeing. But
 the import of 24:18 and the doctrine we have been explicating is that
 their ultimate nonexistence and their conventional existence are the
 same thing. Hence the deep identity of the two truths. And this is because
 emptiness is not other than dependent-arising, and hence because emp-
 tiness is empty.
 Finally, in order to see why chapter 1 is not only an essential ground-
 work for this central argument, but in fact anticipates it and brings its
 conclusion to bear implicitly on the whole remainder of the text, we must
 note that this entire account depends upon the emptiness of dependent
 origination itself. To see this, suppose for a moment that one had the view
 that dependent arising were nonempty (not a crazy view, and not obvi-
 ously incompatible with, and arguably entailed by, certain Buddhist doc-
 trines). Then from the identification of emptiness with dependent arising
 would follow the nonemptiness of emptiness. Moreover, if conventional
 phenomena are empty, and dependent arising itself is nonempty and is
 identified with emptiness, then the two truths are indeed two in every
 sense. Emptiness-dependent arising is self-existent, while ordinary phe-
 nomena are not, and one gets a strongly dualistic, ontological version of
 an appearance-reality distinction. So the argument for the emptiness of
 emptiness in chapter 24 and the identity of the Two Truths with which it
 is bound up depend critically on the argument for the emptiness of
 dependent origination developed in chapter 1.
 5. Simple Emptiness versus the Emptiness of Emptiness
 We can now see why real causation, in the fully reified cement-of-
 the-universe sense, as the instantiation of the relation between explanans
 and explananda could never do from the Madhyamika standpoint. For
 though that would at first glance leave phenomena themselves empty of
 inherent existence, it would retain a nonempty feature of the phenome-
 nal world, and lose the emptiness of emptiness itself. Moreover, a bit of Jay L. Garfield
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 Philosophy East & West
 reflection should lead us to recognize the deep tension in this metaphys-
 ics: if the causal powers of things are ultimately real, it is hard to see how
 one could maintain the merely conventional status of the things them-
 selves. For they could always be individuated as the bearers of those
 ultimately real causal powers, and the entire doctrine of the emptiness of
 phenomena would collapse.
 Substituting conditions for causes solves this problem. For, as we
 have seen, by shifting the account in this way we come to understand
 the relation between conditions and the conditioned as obtaining in
 virtue of regularity and explanatory utility. And both of these deter-
 minants of the relation are firmly rooted in convention rather than
 in any extraconventional facts. Regularity is always regularity-under-a-
 description, and descriptions are, as Nagarjuna puts it, "verbal designa-
 tions." Explanatory utility is always relative to human purposes and
 theoretical frameworks. Dependent origination is thus on this model a
 thoroughly conventional and hence empty alternative to a reified causal
 model, which nonetheless permits all of the explanatory moves that a
 theory committed to causation can make. For every causal link one might
 posit, an equivalent conditional relation can be posited. But the otiose
 and ultimately incoherent posit of causal power is dispensed with on
 Nagarjuna's formulation.
 But if the foregoing interpretation is correct, we can make a more
 radical interpretative claim regarding the structure of Mulamadhyami-
 kakarika: the entire doctrine of the emptiness of emptiness and the unity
 of the Two Truths developed in chapter 24 is already implicit in chapter
 1. Recall the structure of the argument so far, as we have traced the
 complex doctrinal web Nagarjuna spins: the central thesis of chapter 1 as
 we have characterized it is that there is no inherently existent causal
 nexus. The link between conditions and the phenomena dependent upon
 them is empty. To be empty is, however, to be dependent. Emptiness
 itself is, therefore, as is explicitly articulated in chapter 24, dependent
 arising. Hence the emptiness of dependent arising is the emptiness of
 emptiness. And the emptiness of emptiness, as we have seen, is equiva-
 lent to the deep identity between the Two Truths. So the entire central
 doctrine developed in the climactic twenty-fourth chapter is present in
 embryo in the first. And this is why Nagarjuna began with causation.
 Now, to be sure, it is not apparent on first reading the opening
 chapter of the Mulamadhyamikakarika that this is the import of the
 argument. The rhetorical structure of the text only makes this clear in
 retrospect, when enough of the philosophical apparatus is on the table
 to make the entire framework clear. But once we see this framework, a
 rereading of the text in light of this understanding of the opening chapter
 is instructive. For it is one thing to argue for the emptiness of some
 phenomenon simpliciter and quite another to argue for that emptiness
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 with the emptiness of emptiness in mind. If we read the opening chapter
 in the first way, we are likely to miss the force of many of the particular
 analyses in the text the depth of which only emerges in light of the deeper
 thesis of the emptiness of emptiness. If one argues simply that a phenom-
 enon is empty of inherent existence, one leaves open the possibility that
 this is in contrast to phenomena that are inherently existent, and hence
 that the force of this argument is that the phenomenon in question is not
 actually existent. If, on the other hand, one argues that a phenomenon is
 empty in the context of the emptiness of emptiness, one is explicitly
 committed to the view that its emptiness does not entail its nonactuality.
 Emptiness in this context is not nonexistence. The lack of inherent exis-
 tence that is asserted is not the lack of a property possessed by some
 entities but not by others, or a property that an entity could be imagined
 to have, but rather the lack of an impossible attribute. This reorientation
 of the argument gives what might appear to be a series of starkly nihilistic
 analyses a remarkably positive tone.
 We have time here to consider briefly one example of the difference
 that this reading of chapter 1 induces in reading the subsequent text. We
 will consider the analysis of motion and rest in chapter 2. I will not provide
 a verse-by-verse commentary on the chapter here. But let us note the
 following salient features of Nagarjuna's analysis: the target of the argu-
 ment is a view of motion according to which motion is an entity, or at
 least a property with an existence independent of that of moving things,
 or according to which motion is part of the nature of moving things.
 These are versions of what it would be to think of motion as nonempty.
 Nagarjuna argues that from such a view a number of absurd conse-
 quences would follow: things not in motion but which were in motion in
 the past or which will be in the future would have to undergo substantial
 change, effectively becoming different things when they changed state
 from motion to rest or vice versa; a regress would ensue from the need
 for the entity motion itself to be in motion; motion would occur in the
 absence of moving things; the moment at which a thing begins or ceases
 motion would be indescribable. Nagarjuna concludes that a reification of
 motion is incoherent. Motion is therefore empty.
 So far so good. But then, is motion nonexistent? Is the entire universe
 static according to Madhyamika philosophy? If we simply read this chap-
 ter in isolation, that conclusion might indeed seem warranted. It would
 be hard to distinguish emptiness from complete nonexistence. We would
 be left with an illusory world of change and movement, behind which
 would lie a static ultimate reality. But such a reading would be problem-
 atic. For one thing, it would be absurd on its face. Things move and
 change. Second, it would contradict the doctrine of dependent origina-
 tion and change that is the very basis of any Buddhist philosophical
 system, and which Nagarjuna has already endorsed in the opening chap-  Jay L. Garfield
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 ter. How, then, are we to read this discussion more positively? Answering
 this question is hermeneutically critical not only for an understanding of
 this chapter, but-take my word for it-for a reading of the entire text,
 which, if not read with care, can appear unrelentingly nihilistic. And on
 such a nihilistic reading, the appearance/reality distinction that is forced
 can only coincide with the conventional reality/emptiness distinction,
 resulting in a denial of reality to the mundane world and a reification of
 emptiness itself.
 The positive account we are after emerges when we recall the empti-
 ness of emptiness and read this second chapter in the context of the
 reinterpreted first chapter: emptiness itself, as we have seen, according
 to the analysis of dependent arising, is dependently arisen. It is nothing
 but the emptiness of conventional phenomena, and is the fact of their
 being dependent and conventional. If emptiness itself is understood as
 nonempty, on the other hand, then for a phenomenon to be denomi-
 nated empty is for it to be completely nonexistent. For then its merely
 conventional character would stand against the ultimate reality of empti-
 ness itself. We have just seen how this would play out in the case of
 motion, and a moment's reflection would indicate that any other phe-
 nomenon subjected to this analysis would fare about as well. But con-
 sider, on the other hand, how we interpret the status of motion in light
 of the emptiness of its emptiness: the conclusion that motion is empty is
 then simply the conclusion that it is merely conventional and dependent,
 like the putatively moving entities themselves. Since there is no implicit
 contrastive, inherently existent ultimate reality, this conclusion does not
 lead us to ascribe a "second class" or merely apparent existence to
 motion or to movers. Their nonexistence-their emptiness-is hence
 itself non-existent in exactly the sense that they are. Existence-of a
 sort-is thus recovered exactly in the context of an absence of inherent
 existence.
 But existence of what kind? Herein lies the clue to the positive
 construction of motion that emerges. The existence that emerges is a
 conventional and dependent existence. Motion does not exist as an
 entity on this account, but rather as a relation-as the relation between
 the positions of a body at distinct times, and hence is dependent upon
 that body and those positions. Moreover, it emerges as a conventional
 entity in the following critical sense: only to the extent that we make the
 decision to identify entities that differ from each other in position over
 time, but are in other respects quite similar, and which form causal chains
 of a particular sort, as the same entity can we say that the entity so
 identified moves. And this is a matter of choice. For we could decide to
 say that entities that differ in any respect are thereby distinct. If we did
 adopt that convention for individuation, an entity here now and one
 Philosophy East & West there then would ipso facto be distinct entities. And so no single entity
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 could adopt different positions (or different properties) at different times,
 and so motion and change would be nonexistent. It is this dependence
 of motion on the moved, of the status of things as moved on their motion,
 and of both on conventions of individuation that, on this account, consti-
 tutes their emptiness. But this simply constitutes their conventional exis-
 tence, and provides an analysis of the means by which they so exist. The
 emptiness of motion is thus seen to be its existence as conventional and
 as dependent and hence as not other than its conventional existence.
 And this just is the emptiness of emptiness. But in understanding its
 emptiness in this way, we bring motion, change, and movable and
 changeable entities back from the brink of extinction.
 It is thus that seeing Nagarjuna's analysis of the emptiness of phe-
 nomena in the context of the emptiness of emptiness allows for a non-
 nihilistic, nondualistic, constructive reading of the Madhyamika dialectic,
 but a reading which for all of that is rich in its explication of the structure
 of reality and of our relation to it. But this reading is only accessible in the
 chapters analyzing particular phenomena if we already find it in chapter
 1. And this, I have argued, is possible once we reread that initial chapter
 in light of the analysis in chapter 24. The Nagarjuna who emerges is a
 subtle figure indeed.
 6. The Importance of Causation
 The analysis of causation can often look like a highly technical aside
 in philosophy. It might not seem at first glance to be one of the really
 "big" questions, like those concerning what entities there are, what the
 nature of mind is, what the highest good is. By contrast, causation often
 appears to the outsider or to the beginner like one of those recherche
 corners of philosophy that one has to work one's way into. But of course
 even in the history of Western metaphysics and epistemology it has
 always been central. One has only to think of the role of a theory of
 causation for Hume, Kant, Schopenhauer, or Wittgenstein to see this. This
 study of the Mulamadhyamikakarika shows why: a clear understanding
 of the nature of the causal relation is the key to understanding the nature
 of reality itself and of our relation to it. For causation is, as Hume, Kant,
 and Schopenhauer as well as Nagarjuna emphasize, at the heart of our
 individuation of objects, of our ordering of our experience of the world,
 and of our understanding of our own agency in the world. Without a clear
 view of causation, we can have no clear view of anything.
 Nagarjuna begins by examining the causal relation for this reason
 generally. But for Nagarjuna there is a further, more specific reason, one
 which has no explicit parallel in the work of other systematic philoso-
 phers, though it is, to be sure, hinted at darkly in the work of those just
 mentioned. For Nagarjuna, by examining the nature of dependent arising,
 and by showing the emptiness of causation itself, we understand the  Jay L. Garfield
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 nature of emptiness itself, and thereby push the Madhyamika dialectic of
 emptiness to its conclusion. By showing causation to be empty, we show
 all things to be empty, even emptiness itself. Nagarjuna begins here
 because, by beginning with causation, the important conclusions he
 drives at are ready at hand throughout the examination, even if they are
 not made explicit until much later.
 7. Antimetaphysical Pragmatism in Buddhism
 When a Westerner first encounters the Mulamadhyamikakarika or
 other Madhyamika texts, the philosophical approach can appear highly
 metaphysical and downright weird. The unfamiliar philosophical vocabu-
 lary, the highly negative dialectic, and the cryptic verse form are indeed
 forbidding. Most bizarre of all, however, at first glance, is the doctrine that
 all phenomena, including self and its objects, are empty. For indeed
 Nagarjuna and his followers do argue that the entire everyday world is,
 from the ultimate standpoint, nonexistent. And that does indeed appear
 to stand just a bit deeper into philosophical left field than even Berkeley
 dares to play. But if the interpretation I have been urging is adopted, the
 real central thrust of Madhyamika is the demystification of this appar-
 ently mystical conclusion. While it might appear that the Madhyamika
 argue that nothing really exists except a formless, luminous void, in fact
 the entire phenomenal world, persons and all, are recovered within that
 emptiness.
 And if what I have said is correct, the principal philosophical move
 in this demystification of emptiness is the attack on a reified view of
 causality. Nagarjuna replaces the view shared by the metaphysician and
 the person-in-the-street-a view that presents itself as common sense,
 but is in fact deeply metaphysical-with an apparently paradoxical,
 thoroughly empty, but in the end actually commonsense view not only
 of causation, but of the entire phenomenal world.
 APPENDIX: TRANSLATION OF CHAPTERS 1, 2,
 AND 24 OF THE MULAMADHYAMIKAKARIKA
 (TRANSLATED FROM THE TIBETAN TEXT)
 Chapter 1-Examination of Conditions
 1. Neither from itself nor from another
 Nor from both,
 Nor from a non-cause
 Philosophy East & West Does anything whatever, anywhere arise.
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 2. There are four conditions: efficient condition;
 Percept-object condition; immediate condition;
 Dominant condition, just so.
 There is no fifth condition.
 3. The essence of entities
 is not evident in the conditions, and so forth.
 If these things are selfless,
 There can be no otherness-essence.
 4. Power to act does not have conditions,
 There is no power to act without conditions.
 There are no conditions without power to act.
 Nor do any have the power to act.
 5. These give rise to those,
 So these are called conditions.
 As long as those do not come from these,
 Why are these not non-conditions?
 6. For neither an existent nor a nonexistent thing
 Is a condition appropriate.
 If a thing is nonexistent, how could it have a condition?
 If a thing is already existent, what would a condition do?
 7. Neither existents nor
 Nonexistents nor existent nonexistents are produced.
 In this case, how would there be a "productive cause?"
 If it existed, how would it be appropriate?
 8. Certainly, an existent mental episode
 Has no object.
 Since a mental episode is without an object,
 How could there be any percept-condition?
 9. Since things are not arisen,
 It is not acceptable that they cease.
 Therefore, an immediate condition is not reasonable.
 If something has ceased, how could it be a condition?
 10. If things did not exist
 Without essence,
 The phrase, "When this exists so this will be,"
 Would not be acceptable.
 11. In the various conditions united,
 The effect cannot be found.
 Nor in the conditions themselves.
 So how could it come from the conditions?
 12. However, if a nonexistent effect
 Arises from these conditions,
 Why does it not arise
 From non-conditions? Jay L. Garfield
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 13. If the effect is the conditions' essence,
 Then the conditions do not have their own essence.
 So, how could an effect come
 From something that is essenceless?
 14. Therefore, conditions have no essence.
 If conditions have no essence, there are no effects.
 If there are no effects without conditions,
 How will conditions be evident?
 Chapter 2-Examination of Motion
 1. What has been moved is not moving.
 What has not been moved is not moving.
 Apart from what has been moved and what has not been moved,
 Movement cannot be conceived.
 2. Where there is flux, there is motion.
 Since there is flux in the moving,
 And not in the moved or not-moved,
 Motion is in that which is moving.
 3. If motion is in the mover,
 Then how would it be acceptable
 When it is not moving,
 To have called it a mover?
 4. The motion of what moves?
 What motion does not move?
 Given that that which has passed is gone,
 How can motion be in the moved?
 5. If motion is in the mover,
 There would have to be a twofold motion:
 One in virtue of which it is a mover,
 And one in virtue of which it moves.
 6. If there were a twofold motion,
 The subject of that motion would be twofold.
 For without a subject of motion,
 There cannot be motion.
 7. If there is no mover
 It would not be correct to say that there is motion.
 If there is no motion,
 How could a mover exist?
 8. Inasmuch as a real mover does not move,
 And a nonmover does not move,
 Apart from a mover and a nonmover,
 Philosophy East & West What third thing could move?
 240
This content downloaded from 131.229.64.25 on Fri, 03 Aug 2018 16:01:32 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 9. When without motion,
 It is unacceptable to call something a mover,
 How will it be acceptable
 To say that a moving thing moves?
 10. For him from whose perspective a mover moves,
 There is no motion.
 If a real mover were associated with motion,
 A mover would need motion.
 11. If a mover were to move,
 There would be a twofold motion:
 One in virtue of which he is a mover,
 And one in virtue of which the mover moves.
 12. Motion does not begin in what has moved,
 Nor does it begin in what has not moved,
 Nor does it begin in what is moving.
 In what, then, does motion begin?
 13. If motion was begun in the past,
 When should we say it began?
 Not in the nongoing, not in the gone.
 How could it be in the nonmoved?
 14. Since the beginning of motion
 Cannot be conceived,
 What gone thing, what going thing,
 And what nongoing thing can be conceived?
 15. A moving thing is not at rest.
 A nonmoving thing is not at rest.
 Apart from the moving and the nonmoving,
 What third thing is at rest?
 16. If without motion
 It is not appropriate to posit a mover,
 How could it be appropriate to say
 That a moving thing is stationary?
 17. One does not halt from moving,
 Nor from having moved or not having moved.
 Motion and coming to rest
 And starting to move are similar.
 18. That motion is the mover
 Itself is not correct.
 Nor is it correct that
 They are different.
 19. It would follow from
 The identity of mover and motion
 That agent and action
 Are identical. Jay L. Garfield
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 20. It would follow from
 A real distinction between motion and mover
 That there could be a mover without motion
 And motion without a mover.
 21. When neither in identity
 Nor in difference,
 Can motion and the mover be established as existent,
 How can they be established as entities at all?
 22. The motion by means of which a mover is manifest
 Cannot be the motion by means of which he moves.
 He does not exist before that motion,
 So what and where is the thing that moves?
 23. A mover does not carry out a different motion
 From that by means of which he is manifest as a mover.
 Moreover, in one mover
 A twofold motion is unacceptable.
 24. A really existent mover
 Does not move in any of the three ways.
 A nonexistent mover
 Does not move in any of the three ways.
 25. Neither an entity nor a nonentity
 Moves in any of the three ways.
 So movement and motion
 And Agent of motion are nonexistent.
 Chapter 24-Examination of the Four Noble Truths
 1. If all of this is empty,
 Not arising, abiding, or ceasing,
 Then for you, it follows that
 The Four Noble Truths do not exist.
 2. If the Four Noble Truths do not exist,
 Then knowledge, abandonment,
 Meditation, manifestation, and action
 Will be completely impossible.
 3. If these things do not exist,
 The four fruits will not arise.
 Then there will not be the enterers into the path.
 If not, there will not be the eight [kinds of practitioner].
 4. If so the assembly of holy ones
 Itself will not exist.
 If the Four Noble Truths do not exist,
 Philosophy East & West There will be no true Dharma.
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 5. If there is no doctrine and assembly
 How can there be a Buddha?
 If emptiness is conceived in this way
 The Three Jewels are contradicted.
 6. The attainment of the real fruits
 And the Dharma will not exist, and the Dharma itself
 And the conventional truth
 Will be contradicted.
 7. This understanding of yours
 Of emptiness and the purpose of emptiness
 And of the significance of emptiness is incorrect.
 As a consequence you are harmed by it.
 8. The Buddha's teaching of the Dharma
 Is based on two truths:
 A truth of worldly convention
 And an ultimate truth.
 9. Those who do not understand
 The distinction drawn between these two truths
 Do not understand
 The Buddha's profound truth.
 10. Without a foundation in the conventional truth
 The significance of the ultimate cannot be taught.
 Without understanding the significance of the ultimate,
 Liberation is not achieved.
 11. By a misperception of emptiness
 A person of little intelligence is destroyed.
 Like a snake incorrectly seized
 Or like a spell incorrectly cast.
 12. For that reason-that the Dharma is
 Deep and difficult to understand and to learn-
 That (the Buddha's) mind despaired of
 Being able to teach it.
 13. If a fault in understanding should arise
 with regard to emptiness, that would not be good.
 Your confusion about emptiness, however,
 Would not belong to me.
 14. For him to whom emptiness is clear,
 Everything becomes clear.
 For him for whom emptiness is not clear,
 Nothing becomes clear.
 15. If you foist on us
 All of your divergent views
 Then you are like a man who has mounted his horse
 And has forgotten that very horse. Jay L. Garfield
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 16. If the existence of all things
 Is perceived by you in terms of their essence,
 Then this perception of all things
 Will be without the perception of causes and conditions.
 17. Effects and causes
 And agent and action
 And conditions and arising and ceasing
 And effects will be rendered impossible.
 18. Whatever is dependently co-arisen
 That is explained to be emptiness.
 That, being a dependent designation
 Is itself the middle way.
 19. Something that is not dependently arisen,
 Such a thing does not exist.
 Therefore a nonempty thing
 Does not exist.
 20. If all this were nonempty, as in your view,
 There would be no arising and ceasing.
 Then the Four Noble Truths
 Would become nonexistent.
 21. If it is not dependently arisen,
 How could suffering come to be?
 Suffering has been taught to be impermanent,
 And so cannot come from its own essence.
 22. If something comes from its own essence,
 How could it ever be arisen?
 It follows that if one denies emptiness
 There can be no arising [of suffering].
 23. If suffering had an essence,
 Its cessation would not exist.
 So if an essence is posited
 One denies cessation.
 24. If the path had an essence,
 Cultivation would not be appropriate.
 If this path is indeed cultivated,
 It cannot have an essence.
 25. If suffering, arising, and
 Ceasing are nonexistent,
 If through the path suffering ceases,
 In what way could one hope to attain it?
 26. If through its essence
 non-understanding comes to be,
 In what way will understanding arise,
 Philosophy East & West Is not essence stable?
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 27. In this way you should understand
 the activities of relinquishing and realizing and
 Cultivation and the Four Fruits.
 It [essence] is not appropriate.
 28. For an essentialist,
 Since the fruits through their essence
 Are already realized
 In what way could it be appropriate to cultivate them?
 29. Without the fruits, there are no attainers of the fruits,
 Or enterers into that stream,
 From this it follows that the eight kinds of persons do not exist.
 If these do not exist, there is no spiritual community.
 30. From the nonexistence of the Noble Truths
 Would follow the nonexistence of the True Doctrine.
 If there is no Doctrine and no Community,
 How could a Buddha arise?
 31. Your enlightened Buddha,
 Without relying on anything, would have come to be;
 Your Buddha's enlightenment,
 Without relying on anything, would have come to be.
 32. If by means of your essence
 Someone were unenlightened,
 Even by practicing towards enlightenment
 He could not achieve enlightenment.
 33. With neither entities nor nonentities
 There can be no action.
 What could the nonempty do?
 With an essence there is no action.
 34. With neither entities nor nonentities
 The fruit would arise for you.
 So, for you a fruit caused by entities or nonentities
 Could not arise.
 35. If, for you, a fruit
 Were given rise to by either entities or nonentities,
 Then from entities or nonentities
 How could a nonempty fruit arise?
 36. If dependent arising is denied,
 Emptiness itself is rejected.
 This would contradict
 All of the worldly conventions.
 37. If emptiness itself is denied,
 No action will be appropriate.
 Action would not begin,
 And without action there would be no agent. Jay L. Garfield
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 38. If there is essence, all of the flux
 Will be unarising, unceasing,
 And static. And so, the entire sphere of
 Various arisen things would be nonempty.
 39. If the empty does not exist,
 Then action will be without profit.
 The act of ending suffering and
 Abandoning misery and defilement will not exist.
 40. Whoever sees dependent arising
 Also sees Suffering
 And Misery and its arising
 And the path to its cessation.
 NOTES
 Thanks are extended to the Venerable Lobzang Norbu Shastri and Janet
 Gyatso for a very thorough critical reading of and helpful critical com-
 ments on an earlier draft of this essay and of the relevant fragments of
 the translation, and to G. Lee Bowie and Meredith Michaels for sound
 suggestions regarding that draft. This essay has also benefited from the
 insightful questions posed by an audience at Mount Holyoke College, and
 from the sound suggestions of Tom Wartenberg on that occasion. My
 deepest appreciation goes to the Venerable Geshe Yeshes Thap-Kas for
 his patient and lucid teaching of this text and discussion of Nagarjuna's
 position, and to the Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, to its
 director the Venerable Professor Samdhong Rinpoche, and to my many
 colleagues there, including those just mentioned and the Venerable
 Ngawang Samden and the Venerable Geshe Ngawang Sherab. Thanks
 also to my research assistant both at the Institute and at Hampshire
 College, Sri Yeshe Tashi Shastri, and to the Indo-American Fellowship
 program for grant support while I was working on these ideas.
 1 - A fine point, suggested by Janet Gyatso: Though in the end, as we
 shall see, ultimate reality depends on our conventions in a way,
 it depends on our conventions in a very different way from that
 in which conventional reality does. Despite this difference in the
 structure of the relation between convention and reality in the two
 cases, however, it remains a distinctive feature of Nagarjuna's system
 that it is impossible to speak coherently of reality independent of
 conventions.
 2 - Some argue that there is no real difference between causes and
 Philosophy East & West conditions; some that a cause is one kind of condition; some that
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 efficient causes are causes, and that all other causal factors contrib-
 uting to an event are conditions. Some like my reading. I have found
 no unanimity on this interpretative question, either among Western
 Buddhologists or among Tibetan scholars. The canonical texts are
 equivocal as well. I do not argue that the distinction I here attribute
 to Nagarjuna, which I defend on hermeneutical grounds, is necessar-
 ily drawn in the same way throughout the Buddhist philosophical
 world, or even throughout the Prasangika-Madhyamika literature. But
 it is the one Nagarjuna draws.
 3 - There are two kinds of case to be made for attributing this distinction
 to Nagarjuna in this chapter. Most generally, there is the hermeneu-
 tical argument that this makes the best philosophical sense of the
 text. It gets Nagarjuna drawing a distinction that is clearly suggested
 by his philosophical outlook and that lines up nicely with the techni-
 cal terms he deploys. But we can get more textually fine-grained as
 well: in the first verse, Nagarjuna explicitly rejects the existence of
 efficacy, and pointedly uses the word "cause." He denies that there
 are such things. Nowhere in chapter 1 is there a parallel denial of the
 existence of conditions. On the contrary, in verse 2 he positively
 asserts that there are four kinds of them. To be sure, this could be
 read as a mere partitioning of the class of effects that are described
 in Buddhist literature. But there are two reasons not to read it thus.
 First, Nagarjuna does not couch the assertion in one of his "It might
 be said" locutions. Second, he never takes it back. The positive tone
 the text takes regarding conditions is continued in verses 4 and 5,
 where Nagarjuna asserts that conditions are conceived without effi-
 cacy in contrast with the causes rejected in 1, and where he endorses
 a regularist view of conditions. So it seems that Nagarjuna does use
 the "cause"/"condition" distinction to mark a distinction between
 the kind of association he endorses as an analysis of dependent
 arising and one he rejects.
 4- The Venerable Lobzang Norbu Shastri has pointed out to me that
 this verse may not in fact be original with Nagarjuna, but is a quota-
 tion from sutra. It appears in the Kamsika-prajinaparamitasutra as well
 as in the Madhyamika-Salistambasutra. Inasmuch as these are both
 late texts, their chronological relation to Nagarjuna's text is not clear.
 5 - There is also a nice regress to be developed here that Nagarjuna
 does not explicitly note in this chapter, though he does make use of
 it later in the Mlaamadhyamikakarika (chap. 7): Even if we did posit
 a causal power mediating between causes and their effects, we
 would have to explain how it is that a cause event gives rise to
 or acquires that power, and how the power brings about the effect.
 We now have two nexuses to explain, and now each one has an Jay L. Garfield
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 unobservable entity on one end. In Garfield 1990 1 explore this prob-
 lem in more detail and note that it is explored both by Hume and
 by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus.
 6 - The Madhyamika position implies that we should seek to explain
 regularities by reference to their embeddedness in other regularities,
 and so on. To ask why there are regularities at all, on such a view,
 would be to ask an incoherent question: the fact of explanatorily
 useful regularities in nature is what makes explanation and investiga-
 tion possible in the first place, and is not something itself that can be
 explained. After all, there is only one universe, and truly singular
 phenomena, on such a view, are inexplicable in principle. This may
 connect deeply to the Buddha's insistence that questions concerning
 the beginning of the world are unanswerable.
 7 - A formula familiar in the sutras of the Pali canon.
 8 - Though this is beyond the scope of this essay, this last fact, the
 emptiness of the relation between the conventional world of depen-
 dently arisen phenomena and emptiness itself is of extreme impor-
 tance at another stage of the Madhyamika dialectic, and comes to
 salience in the VigrahavyavartanTand in CandrakTrti's Prasannapada.
 For this amounts to the emptiness of the central ontological tenet of
 Nagarjuna's system, and is what allows him to claim, despite all
 appearances, that he is positionless. That is, Nagarjuna thereby has a
 ready reply to the following apparent reductio argument (reminiscent
 of classical Greek and subsequent Western challenges to Pyrrhonian
 skepticism): You say that all things are, from the ultimate standpoint,
 nonexistent. That must then apply to your own thesis. It, therefore, is
 really nonexistent, and your words are hence only nominally true.
 Your own thesis, therefore, denies its own ground and is self-
 defeating. This objection would be a sound one against a view that
 in fact asserted its own inherent existence, or grounded its truth on
 an inherently existing ontological basis. But, Nagarjuna suggests here,
 that is not the case for his account. Rather, on his analysis, every-
 thing, including this very thesis, has only nominal truth, and nothing
 is either inherently existent, or true in virtue of designating an inher-
 ently existent fact.
 9 - This, of course, is the key to the soteriological character of the text:
 reification is the root of grasping and craving, and hence of all
 suffering. And it is perfectly natural, despite its incoherence. By un-
 derstanding emptiness Nagarjuna intends one to break this habit and
 extirpate the root of suffering. But if in doing so one falls into the
 abyss of nihilism, nothing is achieved. For then, action itself is impos-
 Philosophy East & West sible and senseless, and one's realization amounts to nothing. Or
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 again, if one relinquishes the reification of phenomena but reifies
 emptiness, that issues in a new grasping and craving-the grasping
 of emptiness and the craving for nirvana-and a new round of
 suffering. Only with the simultaneous realization of the emptiness
 but conventional reality of phenomena and of the emptiness of
 emptiness, argues Nagarjuna, can suffering be wholly uprooted.
 10- Paradox may appear to loom at this point. For, one might argue, if
 emptiness is empty, and if to be empty is to be merely conventional,
 then the emptiness of any phenomenon is a merely conventional
 fact. Moreover, to say that entities are merely conventional is merely
 conventional. Hence it would appear optional, as all conventions are,
 and it would further seem to be open to say that things are in fact
 nonconventional, and therefore nonempty. This would be a deep
 incoherence indeed at the heart of Nagarjuna's system. But the
 paradox is merely apparent. The appearance of paradox derives from
 seeing "conventional" as functioning logically like a negation opera-
 tor-a subtle version of the nihilistic reading Nagarjuna is at pains to
 avoid, with a metalinguistic twist. For then, each iteration of "conven-
 tional" would cancel the previous occurrence, and the conventional
 character of the fact that things are conventional would amount to
 the claim that really they are not, or at least that they might not be.
 But in Nagarjuna's philosophical approach, the sense of the term is
 more ontological than logical: to say of a phenomenon or of a fact
 that it is conventional is to characterize its mode of subsistence. It is
 to say that it is without an independent nature. The fact that a
 phenomenon is without independent nature is, to be sure, a further
 phenomenon-a higher-order fact. But that fact, too, is without an
 independent nature. It, too, is merely conventional. This is another
 way of putting the strongly nominalistic character of Madhyamika
 philosophy. So, a Platonist, for instance, might urge (and the Mad-
 hyamika would agree) that a perceptible phenomenon is ultimately
 unreal. But the Platonist would assert that its properties are ulti-
 mately real. And if some Buddhist-influenced Platonist would note
 that among the properties of a perceptible phenomenon is its empti-
 ness and its conventional reality, s/he would assert that these, as
 properties, are ultimately real. This is exactly where Nagarjuna parts
 company with all forms of realism. For he gives the properties a
 nominalistic construal, and asserts that they, including the properties
 of emptiness and conventionality, are, like all phenomena, merely
 nominal, merely empty, and merely conventional. And so on for their
 emptiness and conventionality. The nominalism undercuts the nega-
 tive interpretation of "conventional" and so renders the regress
 harmless. Jay L. Garfield
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